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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
   
 This case returns to us on remand from the United 
States Supreme Court.  The action was originally brought by James 
E. Gottshall, a railroad worker, against his employer, 
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail).  Gottshall sought 
damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 
U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988), for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress.  Concluding that the FELA provided no remedy for the 
plaintiff's emotional injuries in this case, the district court 
granted Conrail's motion for summary judgment. Gottshall v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp., 773 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1991).  This 
Court, by a divided panel, reversed and remanded, finding the 
injuries to Gottshall to be both foreseeable and possessed of 
sufficient indicia of genuineness.  Gottshall v. Consolidated 
Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 Following the denial of its petition for rehearing, 
Conrail filed a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme 
Court to obtain review of this case and of the companion case of 
Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993).  
The Supreme Court agreed to hear both cases.  By its decision of 
June 24, 1994, the Court reversed both cases and remanded them to 
  
us.  Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, --- U.S. ---, 114 S. 
Ct. 2396 (1994).  The Court instructed us to enter judgment 
against the plaintiff in Carlisle and to reconsider the negligent 
infliction of emotional distress claim in Gottshall under the 
common law zone of danger test.  Id. at ---, 114 S. Ct. at 2411-
12.  For the reasons that follow, we find that the plaintiff in 
Gottshall cannot satisfy the strictures of the zone of danger 
test as articulated by the Supreme Court. 
 I. 
 Because the facts of this case have been discussed 
extensively in earlier opinions, we will be brief.  James 
Gottshall served on a Conrail work crew which was assigned on an 
oppressively hot August day to replace defective railroad track 
in a remote location between Watsontown and Strawberryridge, 
Pennsylvania.  Gottshall's work crew included his friend of 
fifteen years, Richard Johns.  The crew was supervised by Michael 
Norvick.  Conrail was under time pressure to prepare for a safety 
inspection and so the work crew was pushed to complete the task.  
Conrail provided only one scheduled break, for lunch, and 
discouraged unscheduled breaks.  Conrail did, however, make water 
available to the men on an as-needed basis.1    
                     
1
.  There is no evidence in the record to indicate either that 
the conditions under which the crew was working violated any work 
rules or work conditions, agreed upon by the union and management 
or that any union member working on the crew that day was not 
physically qualified to perform his assigned duties.  Cf. 
Holliday v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 914 F.2d 421, 424 (3d Cir. 
1990): 
 
  
 About two and one-half hours into the job, while 
Richard Johns was cutting a rail, he collapsed.  Gottshall and 
the other workers rushed to Johns' assistance.  Johns, who had 
high blood pressure and was overweight, was having trouble with 
the weather conditions.  The crew members tended to him until 
Norvick ordered them to return to work.  Within five minutes 
Johns collapsed again.  This time it was apparent that Johns was 
seriously afflicted.  Gottshall realized that Johns was having a 
heart attack and, because Gottshall was the only person at the 
scene certified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, he began 
administering CPR to Johns.   
 Supervisor Norvick also appreciated that Johns now 
required immediate medical attention.  Norvick's initial attempts 
to radio to the base station for help were unsuccessful because, 
unbeknownst to Norvick, Conrail had taken the base radio off-line 
for repairs.  Norvick finally drove out in his truck to secure 
help.  He summoned paramedics who arrived at the site some forty 
minutes after Gottshall had begun CPR.  By this time, however, 
Johns had died.  The paramedics ordered the crew to leave the 
body where it lay, covered by a sheet, until the coroner arrived.  
(..continued) 
 [P]laintiffs . . . were allegedly injured by 
performing the normal duties of their jobs as 
structured by management and as monitored by 
the union.  As work rules and working 
conditions represent issues that are at the 
heart of labor-management negotiations, the 
court will not upset the delicate balance of 
the collective bargaining agreement absent a 
more compelling reason. 
  
Shortly thereafter, Norvick directed the crew to return to work.  
The crew continued working for several hours.  The coroner on his 
arrival determined that Johns had suffered a heart attack caused 
in part by the heat, humidity, and strenuous activity. 
 Gottshall experienced a severe reaction to his 
involvement in the incident.  In the days that followed, the crew 
returned to the site to work the same long hours under the same 
sweltering weather conditions.2  Gottshall, however, became 
increasingly distraught and feared that he too would have a heart 
attack.  After a few days, Gottshall left work and secluded 
himself in the basement of his home.  He was then admitted to a 
psychiatric hospital where he was diagnosed with major depression 
and post traumatic stress disorder.  His symptoms included 
extensive weight loss, suicidal preoccupations, insomnia, and 
nausea.   
 II. 
 Gottshall brought this action in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant 
to the FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).  We had jurisdiction on 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).  Following remand from the 
Supreme Court, we now have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 
(1988). 
                     
2
.  The parties do not contest that the radio link was back in 
commission during this subsequent period. 
  
 Our task on remand is to apply the common law zone of 
danger test, as defined by the Supreme Court, in reconsidering 
Gottshall's FELA claim.  Both parties agree, and the Supreme 
Court has advised, that the present factual record is 
sufficiently developed for this purpose. See Gottshall, --- U.S. 
---, 114 S. Ct. at 2411. See also Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 
F.3d 848, 856-63 (3rd Cir. 1994) applic. for stay denied, --- 
U.S. ---, 114 S. Ct. 909 (1994) (finding no need to reopen record 
when "the Supreme Court remanded `for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion'"); Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 939 
F.2d 458, 459-460 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 974 
(1991).  Therefore, with the zone of danger test in mind, we will 
address the issues on the existing record. 
 Because this appeal is from the district court's 
granting of Conrail's motion for summary judgment, our standard 
of review of whether Gottshall's claim remains actionable under 
the FELA is plenary.  See Dent v. Cunningham, 786 F.2d 173, 175 
(3d Cir. 1986).   Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, an entry of summary judgment is only appropriate 
if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  
In conducting this evaluation, we are obliged to view the facts 
in a light most favorable to Gottshall as the non-moving party. 
See Erie Telecommunications v. Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
  
 Conrail, in pressing its motion for summary judgment, 
makes two principal arguments which it draws from the Supreme 
Court's discussion of the FELA and the zone of danger test.  
First, Conrail draws an analogy between the facts in this case 
and those in Carlisle, 990 F.2d 90 (1993), in support of its 
premise that generalized work conditions cannot give rise to an 
actionable FELA claim for emotional distress.  Second, Conrail 
maintains that the zone of danger test must be construed to 
permit recovery only by those persons who are at risk of an 
actual physical impact.   
 Gottshall vigorously contests both positions.  He 
asserts that the extreme working conditions, which caused Richard 
Johns' heart attack and under which Conrail forced Gottshall to 
work both before and after Johns' death, caused him subjectively 
to fear for his physical safety and to suffer a complete 
emotional collapse with attendant physical manifestations.  
Gottshall also argues for a broader construction of the zone of 
danger, either one that does not require a threat of physical 
impact or one that accepts merely the risk of slight physical 
contact, such as dust in the eye or smoke inhalation. 
 A.  
 In this case, the Supreme Court for the first time 
recognized a plaintiff's right to recover under the FELA for 
negligently produced emotional distress.  See Gottshall, --- U.S. 
at ---, 114 S. Ct. at 2409.  The Court found support both in the 
  
statute and at common law for extending the FELA's coverage to 
purely emotional claims.3  In examining the statute itself, the 
Court reiterated the premise that the FELA should be liberally 
construed in a manner consistent with its remedial purpose.  Id. 
at ---, 114 S. Ct. at 2404.  See also Rogers v. Missouri Pacific 
R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957).  Noting that the FELA is silent on 
the issue of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, the Court turned to common law principles to fill the 
statutory gaps.  Gottshall, --- U.S. at ---, 114 S. Ct. at 2404.  
See also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 
557, 568 (1987).  Cf. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 426, 432 (1958).  
The Court surveyed the States and determined that nearly all have 
permitted claims for emotional injury in one form or another. 
Gottshall, --- U.S. at ---, 114 S. Ct. at 2405.  Based in part on 
these observations, the Court found that within the broad duty to 
furnish workers with a safe work place there was "a duty under 
FELA [for an employer] to avoid subjecting its workers to 
negligently inflicted emotional injury."  Id. at ---, 114 S. Ct. 
at 2408, (quoting Buell, 480 U.S. at 558).       
                     
3
.  By "purely emotional claims," we mean mental disturbance 
unaccompanied by a contemporaneous infliction of physical injury.  
This concept is distinguishable from damages for pain and 
suffering which often attach to claims for physical injury.  
Moreover, in defining "purely emotional claims" we do not take a 
position as to whether emotional distress, to be actionable, must 
produce accompanying physical manifestations in reaction to the 
mind's disturbance.  Because Gottshall's emotional disturbance 
did affect him physically, e.g., extensive weight loss, we need 
not reach that issue.  See Bloom v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 41 
F.3d 911, 915 n.5 (3d Cir. 1994). 
  
 Although the Court was willing to recognize such a duty 
as a conceptual matter, it also appreciated that, as a practical 
matter, limitations were warranted to restrict the scope of an 
FELA employer's duty.  The Court was concerned by what it saw, if 
recovery were permitted for emotional distress, as the "very real 
possibility of nearly infinite and unpredictable liability for 
defendants."  Id. at ---, 114 S.Ct. at 2405.  The Court noted 
that the FELA retains the common law concept of negligence and so 
"`does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his 
employees.'"  Id. ---, 114 US.Ct. at 2408, (quoting Ells v. Union 
Pacific R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 653 (1947)).  Developing this theme 
of limited liability, the Court turned to several common law 
"tests" or "rules" which have restricted the right to recover for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.   
 The Court reviewed the "physical impact,"  the "zone of 
danger," and  the "relative bystander" common law tests.  It 
rejected the "physical impact" and the "relative bystander" tests 
as either too restrictive or inapplicable, and it settled on the 
"zone of danger" test as the best measure of recovery under the 
FELA.  Id. at ---, 114 S. Ct. at 2410-11.  In doing so, the Court 
consulted the common law of 1908, the year the FELA was enacted, 
and found that the zone of danger test was considered both more 
progressive and less restrictive than its counterparts of the 
same era.  Id.  The Court characterized these qualities of the 
  
zone of danger test as consistent with the FELA's broad 
construction and remedial purpose.   
 The Court noted nevertheless that the statute's primary 
purpose remained the protection of workers from physical, rather 
than emotional, perils.  Id. at ---, 114 S. Ct. at 2410.  See 
also Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 813 (1985), 
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987).  Acknowledging that the FELA's 
goal of liberal recovery was tempered by the statute's emphasis 
on physical injuries, the Court found, however, that the 
statute's reference to "injury" could encompass both physical and 
emotional injury and that the zone of danger test best harmonized 
these considerations: 
 Under this test, a worker within the zone of 
danger of physical impact will be able to 
recover for emotional injury caused by fear 
of physical injury to himself, whereas a 
worker outside the zone will not.  Railroad 
employees thus will be able to recover for 
injuries - physical and emotional - caused by 
the negligent conduct of their employers that 
threatens them imminently with physical 
impact.   
Gottshall,       U.S. at      , 114 S.Ct. at 2410-11. 
    
 B. 
 Although the Supreme Court generally upheld an FELA 
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
  
the Court did not precisely define what situations might place a 
plaintiff in a position to be within the zone of danger.4 
 For instance, does the Supreme Court's zone of danger 
test require the imminent threat of a physical impact or does it 
require merely a threat of physical harm?  In our recent decision 
in Bloom v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 41 F.3d 911 (3d Cir. 1994), 
we noted the Supreme Court's various articulations of the zone of 
danger test at certain instances throughout the opinion are 
somewhat imprecise.5  41 F.3d at 914-15.  We found, however, in 
Bloom that it was not necessary to expressly resolve this issue 
as the plaintiff was threatened with neither physical harm nor 
physical impact.  We conclude from our review of the facts in the 
present case that we again do not have to resolve this issue.   
                     
4
.  In moving on to our discussion of the zone of danger, we will 
not dwell on the negligence of Conrail.  Whether Conrail's 
conduct placed Gottshall in a zone of danger is a different 
question than whether or not Conrail's conduct satisfied the 
requirement of ordinary negligence (which is necessary for FELA 
liability in any case).  That negligence, however, to the extent 
that Conrail interrupted the crew's radio link without warning 
and without providing an alternate means of communication, is 
admitted by the parties.  Because there is agreement on this 
aspect of Conrail's negligence, we do not need to go on to 
resolve whether a combination of other factors, such as the 
extreme working conditions and/or Conrail's ordering the crew to 
go back to work while Jones's body lay covered beside the track, 
might also constitute negligence on Conrail's part.  
5
.  For instance, at one point the Court refers to the zone of 
danger test as limiting recovery to plaintiffs "who are placed in 
immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct."  Gottshall, --- 
U.S. ---, 114 S. Ct. at 2406 (emphasis added). The Court later 
refers to an actionable claim as one involving "a worker within 
the zone of danger of physical impact." Id. at ---, 114 S. Ct. at 
2410 (emphasis added). 
  
 We will first consider whether James Gottshall was 
subjected to the threat of a physical impact.  In their briefs, 
the parties contest the specific meaning of the term "impact."  
Recognizing that we cannot anticipate every possible situation 
that may give rise to an impact, we decline to provide a 
comprehensive definition of what constitutes an impact.  Suffice 
it to say that what Gottshall experienced involved no impact and 
Gottshall therefore was not in the zone of danger, if the test is 
to be construed to require threat of impact.  If the sun's rays 
and heated air constitute physical impacts, then many work place 
situations could give rise to an impact within the meaning of the 
test.6  Such an encompassing definition of impact would undercut 
the Court's desire to draw reasonable limits to employer 
liability for emotional distress claims.  
 We will next consider whether Gottshall was placed in 
immediate risk of physical harm.  Here, the crew was working 
under time pressure on an oppressively hot August afternoon and 
the base radio was taken off-line for repair.  However, as we 
noted earlier, there is no evidence in the record to indicate 
that Gottshall, who was thirty four and in good physical 
condition, was not physically qualified to perform his assigned 
                     
6
.  We do not determine at this time whether our definition of 
impact under the FELA reaches contacts with such intangibles as 
smoke, gases, or drugs. See, e.g. Plummer v. United States, 580 
F.2d 72, 75-76 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding, in non-FELA context, that 
exposure to tuberculosis bacilli constituted physical impact 
under both the zone of danger and physical impact tests). 
  
duties.  While it was extremely hot that afternoon in 
northcentral Pennsylvania, it was still, for purposes of the zone 
of danger test, within the bounds of conditions under which 
Conrail crews were expected to work.  Indeed, Gottshall does not 
contend that the conditions under which he was working violated 
any work rules.  In sum, we simply do not view the physical 
working conditions to be extreme and dangerous enough as to place 
this plaintiff in immediate risk of physical harm.7 
 
   III. 
 We will, therefore, affirm the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Conrail.  We find that Gottshall 
was not within the zone of danger because Conrail's negligence 
                     
7
.  In Bloom, we noted that it is not clear whether a plaintiff 
would be required, in a FELA action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, to fear physical injury to himself as a prima 
facie element or whether the lack of such fear would merely be 
considered in determining damages.  Bloom, 41 F.3d at 915 n.4.  
We also noted in Bloom that some common-law zone of danger tests 
include contemporaneous fear as a prima facie element, but that 
the Supreme Court in Gottshall appeared to adopt the damages 
approach.  Id.   As in Bloom, it is not necessary in this case to 
decide the issue since Gottshall otherwise fails to satisfy the 
zone of danger test.  We do note, however, that to the extent 
that fear does go to liability, Gottshall, like Bloom, would fail 
a contemporaneous fear requirement.  Gottshall claims that his 
mental distress arose after Johns' death and was brought about by 
his fear that the heat and strenuous work pace would also cause 
him to suffer a fatal heart attack.  As the district court 
pointed out, however, Gottshall cannot show that he perceived any 
threat of physical harm during the time that Conrail had 
negligently closed down the radio link, nor can he show that any 
negligent act was committed by Conrail during the ensuing period 
when he feared the working conditions might cause him to suffer a 
heart attack.  Gottshall, 773 F. Supp. at 782. 
  
threatened him neither with the threat of physical impact nor 
with the threat of physical harm. 
 
 
 
 
 
